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Hodapp et al.: European Union Law

POSITIVE ACTION AND
EUROPEAN UNION LAW IN
THE YEAR 2000

PAUL HODAPP, THOMAS TRELOGAN AND
STEVE MAZURANA'

1.

INTRODUCTION

This paper is the third in a series in which we examine the similarities
and differences between the European and American approaches to the
problem of positive (or affirmative) action. In the two previous papers
we examined whether certain positive action plans adopted by European
legislatures would be constitutional under the Equal Protection clause of
the U.S. Constitution.' In this paper our aim is limited to updating our
analysis of positive action in the European Union with an analysis of
three recent European Court of Justice ("the Court") decisions. The
decisions are Re: Badeck,2 Abrahamsson,3 and Schnorbus v. Land Hesse. 4
We shall also consider proposed changes to the Equal Treatment
Directive, the basic legal principle at the foundation of the Court's
judgments in these cases.
* Paul Hodapp, J.D., University of Denver, 1980, Professor, Philosophy Department,
University of Northern Colorado; Thomas Trelogan, A.B.D., Yale University, 1969, Assistant
Professor, Philosophy Department, University of Northern Colorado; Steve Mazurana, A.B.D.
Indiana University, 1969, Professor, Political Science Department, University of Northern Colorado.
The authors wish to thank Peggy Ribich for all of her support and assistance.
1.
Paul Hodapp & Steve Mazurana, Affir1lUltive Action in Public Employment: An
International Comparison, 16 MIDWEST L. REV. 90 (1999); Paul Hodapp, Steve Mazurana and
Thomas Trelogan, AjJir1lUltive Action in Public Employment: An International Comparison II, in
EUROPEAN STUDIES CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS: SELECTED PAPERS FROM 1993 TO 1999, 171-184
(Odwarka and Stefancic eds., 2001). For a general discussion of the equal treatment principle in
European Union law, see ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE
(Oxford University Press 1999).
2.
Case C-158/97, re: Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875 (Mar. 28, 2000).
3.
Case C-407/98, Abrahamsson v. Fogelqvist, 2000 E.C.R. 1-5539 (July 6, 2000).
4.
Case C-79199, Schnorbus v. Land Hesse, 2000 E.C.R. 1-0000 (Dec. 7,2000).
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II.
THE ISSUE iN THREE RECENT CASES OF THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF JUSTICE
The general issue before the Court in these cases was whether certain
provisions of the national laws at issue were consistent with the Equal
Treatment Directive. s These provisions provided positive or affirmative
action in public employment for women in order to gain equal access to
employment by means of binding employment targets.
A.

BACKGROUND OF POSITIVE ACTION IN EUROPE

The Equal Treatment Directive provides that there shall be no
discrimination, either direct or indirect, on the basis of sex, but there is
an exception to the prohibition for measures to promote equality of
opportunity for men and women, particularly those measures that remove
existing inequalities affecting women's opportunities. The Court applied
the principles it had already enunciated in Marschall V. Land NordrheinWestfalen 6 and Kalanke V. Freie Hansestadt Bremen. 7 In deciding the
general issue in the three cases under discussion, the Court was not
required to establish new legal principles for the interpretation of the
Directive.
However, the Court relied on changes that had been made in European
Community law since the time it reached these decisions. A new
paragraph 4 of Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome (now 141 of the Treaty
of Amsterdam)8 states that to achieve full practical equality between men
and women in pubiic employment, member states may adopt specific
advantages for an under-represented sex to pursue a vocational activity
or to overcome disadvantages in professional careers. Declaration 28
concerning Article 141 annexed to the final act of the Treaty of
Amsterdam states that member states should, in the first instance, aim at
improving the situation of women in working life. 9

S. Council Directive 76/207, 1976 OJ. (L 39/40).
6.
Case C-409/95 , Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1997 E.C.R. 1-06363, 1997
E.C.1. Celex Nexis 4798 (Nov. II, 1997).
7.
Case C-450/93, Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, 1995 E.C.R. 1-03051 (1995). The
basic rule established by these two cases is that an employer must have discretion to overcome the
presumption favoring a female candidate due to information concerning special circumstances of
equally qualified male candidates so long as these special circumstances are not themselves
discriminatory.
8. 4 Eur. Union L Rep. (CCH) para. 25,500 at 10526-7 (ratified May 1, 1999).
9.
[d.
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In our view the language of the Treaty is stronger and more proactive
regarding equality for women than the language of the Directive. The
Directive permits member states to adopt positive action plans if they are
intended to achieve equality of opportunity for women by removing
obstacles to fair competition between men and women. The Treaty
permits the use of positive action not only as a means to formal or
competitive equality but also as a means to substantive equality for
women as persons who work but who have additional responsibilities to
provide for families as well. \0
Similarly, the Advocate General ("AG") who authored the opmlon to
assist the Court in Re: Badeck took a more radical position than the
Court in relying, as he did, on these additions to European Community
law. He interpreted the new provisions in the Treaty of Amsterdam as
requiring a broad interpretation of the Equal Treatment Directive and the
equality provisions in the treaties - one that capitalizes as much as
possible on what they permit. 1I The AG went so far as to suggest that
positive action is a permissible means to equal treatment of men and
women when some gender-based disadvantage cannot be remedied in
any other way. In effect, the AG cast doubt on the Court's interpretation
that positive action is an exception to the equality principle in the
Directive that must be narrowly interpreted.
The AG also rejected the Court's starting gate analogy, an analogy that
suggests that positive action is justified only when it enables women to
compete with men for jobs. Instead, the AG proposed that positive
action may be justified when women are in a particularly difficult
situation in the job market and the principle of non-discrimination does
not assist in improving their situation. In these situations member states
may use positive preferences for women to increase the number of
women in the workplace and thus to have a real effect on the social

10. Those who seek formal equality focus on notions of equal opportunity and fonnal,
procedural, and neutral application of non-discriminatory and gender-neutral law in public
employment and in the marketplace. Those who seek substantive equality are more concerned with
results and outcomes, with equal shares rather than equal treatment. Proponents of substantive
equality favor direct intervention in workplace practices in order to achieve a proportional
distribution of men and women in the workforce. They also favor such measures as quotas,
preferential hiring of women and unconditional rights for the disadvantaged gender or group in the
workplace. See Catherine Barnard, Gender Equality in the EU: A Balance Sheet, in THE EU AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 215-279 (Alston ed., 1999).
II. Case C-158/97, re: Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875 (Mar. 28, 20(0), Opinion at para. 26-27.
For a general discussion of the Advocate General in the European Court of Justice, see ARNULL,
supra note I, 7-9. In summary, the AG, a member of the Court, submits a written opinion to the
deciding judges of the Court. The AG's opinion outlines how the case fits within existing EC law
and recommends a resolution of the case which the Court may use as the basis for its judgment.
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integration of women, provided the content of the positive action plan is
not arbitrary, that it does not excessively impinge on the rights of men,
and that it is not disproportionate to the real needs of women. In other
words, the AG adopted a substantive, results-oriented approach to
positive action to replace the formal, rights-oriented approach the Court
had previously used.
The distinction between formal and substantive equality must be grasped
to understand the position of the Court in the cases that will be discussed
below. The Court, unlike this AG, has accepted formal or competitive
positive action as the only permissible means to achieve gender equality,
understood in terms of the goal of removing obstacles to equal
opportunity for women. The Court appears to believe that its position is
a compromise between permitting no gender discrimination whatsoever
and promoting substantive equality for women. The Court may also
reject the communalistic defense sometimes given for substantive gender
equality, namely, that substantive gender equality is a social good that
outweighs the right of each individual to have his or her merit evaluated
individually.12
It is also important to understand the limited jurisdiction of the Court to
hear these cases. The procedural posture of these three cases was that the
Court had jurisdiction to hear the cases pursuant to Article 177 (now 234
of the Treaty of Amsterdam) which permits the Court to hear cases
submitted by national courts within the European Dnion.13 In each case
the national court asked the Court to interpret the relevant, European
Union law so that the national court might use that interpretation of ED
law in interpreting its national law consistently with ED law. The Court
did not render a judgment for one party under the national law; it
clarified EU law for the national court that rendered a judgment for the
parties. Thus, the function of the Court under Article 177 is to ensure the
uniform interpretation of EU law, not by making direct rulings on the
compatibility of national law with ED law but by interpreting EU law in
the context of a specific national law.

12.

Services Industrial Professional & Technical Union [hereinafter SIPTU) at www.siptu.ie.

See also Gwyneth Pitt, Can Reverse Discrimination Be Justified? in DISCRIMINATION: THE LIMIT OF
LAW 281-99 (Hepple and Szyszcak eds., 1992).
13. Eur. Union L Rep., supra note 8. For a general discussion of preliminary rulings by the
Court, see RENAUD DEHOUSSE, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE (St. Martin's Press 1998) and
ARNULL, supra note I, at 49-69.
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Issue

37

The specific issue before the Court was whether certain provisions
adopted by the Government of Hesse, Germany, containing binding
targets for increasing the proportion of women in sectors of public
employment in which they were under-represented could be so
interpreted as to be consistent with the Equal Treatment Directive.
2.

Procedural History

Forty-six members of the Hesse legislature (the applicants) initiated legal
proceedings to review the legality of certain positive action provisions in
the law of Hesse. The national court sought a preliminary ruling from
the European Court of Justice interpreting the EU's equality law with
respect to the national law. The applicants argued that the national law
violated the principle of merit and the fundamental right of each
employee to equality of opportunity because it ensured a final result or
quota and thereby gave women an unfair advantage in employment.
3.

First Challenged Provision

The Land Hesse required that its administrative departments eliminate
under-representation of women by means of advancement plans for
women. I' Each plan had to provide that more than one-half of job
openings must be offered to women who were equally qualified with the
male candidates, unless there existed reasons of greater legal weight that
opposed the preference for a female candidate. The plans for each career
group were valid for two years or until the number of women employees
equaled or exceeded the number of male employees in the group.
AG Saggio decided that this provision of the law could be interpreted as
consistent with the EU law. 15 The national law did not prevent male
applicants from competing with female applicants by establishing a
quota of female hires without regard to the suitability of all candidates
for a specific position.
The Court agreed that there was no inconsistency between the national
law and the equality provisions of EU law so long as the national law

14.
15.
33-38.

Case C-158/97, re: Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875 (Mar. 28, 2000), Judgment at para. 7-9.
Case C-158/97, re: Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875 (Mar. 28, 2000), Opinion at para. 7,8 &
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allowed each applicant to be objectively assessed for each position in a
way that involved considering all relevant information for each candidate
for each position.1 6 The national law allowed preferences to promote the
disabled, part-time employees, certain former public service and military
employees, and men who had been unemployed for a long time. 17 Thus,
in evaluating each candidate, an employer had to consider all these
preferences, in addition to the preference for women. Furthermore, an
employer, in deciding whether a preference had been rebutted, had to
consider all relevant individual characteristics of each employee, e.g.,
length of service, work history, and job mobility.
In conclusion, in Re: Badeck the Court continued to insist that any
preference for women in employment constitute not an absolute
presumption but at most a rebuttable presumption that could be rebutted
in favor of a male candidate by any relevant objective consideration that
was not itself discriminatory against women.
4.

Second Challenged Provision

The second specific provision before the Court created binding targets
for women's employment in certain academic positions, i.e., temporary
positions and assistantships. Specifically, the law provided that these
posts had to be filled with the same proportion of women as women
graduates, or those who had received the appropriate training in the
relevant discipline. 18
The AG reached the same result based on the same reasoning he used for
the first issue. 19 The Court agreed.20 The Court noted that any hiring
decision had to be subject to overriding objective criteria such as those
described in the discussion of the first issue. The Court concluded that
the law did not establish a binding target or quota requiring that a certain
number of women be appointed for each position. Instead, the number of
women appointed was fixed by the number of persons trained for the
position. In other words, the quota was not absolute or inflexible but was
relative to a reasonable standard, the number of women trained for the
position. In addition, women were to be encouraged to apply for these
positions, but if no qualified women applied, then a male candidate could
be hired.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Case C-158/97,
[d.
Case C-158/97,
Case C-158/97,
Case C-158/97,

re: Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875 (Mar. 28, 20(0), Judgment at 35-38.
re: Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875 (Mar. 28, 20(0), Judgment at para. 39.
re: Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875 (Mar. 28, 20(0), Opinion at para. 39.
re: Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875 (Mar. 28, 20(0), Judgment at para. 40-44.
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Third Challenged Provision

The third provision before the Court was a provision of the law that fixed
a minimum quota for women receiving job training based on the
proportion of women already employed in specific job sectors, but that
required that at least one-half of all training places be allocated to
women.
The AG allowed that on its face this provision sought a specific result,
namely, a fixed percentage of women in training positions/' but he
maintained that the law could be interpreted as consistent with EO law
because the result sought was not an employment result but a training
result. Consequently, he argued, the provision could be justified as a
way to increase employment opportunities for women by removing an
important cause of their lack of employment, namely, lack of training.
The Court agreed, and carefully distinguished this training case from
cases involving employment decisions. 22 The Court emphasized that
since the state had no monopoly on training opportunities (since training
programs were also available in the private sector) this provision of the
law did not totally exclude men from training opportunities since the law
governed only public employment in Land Hesse. Even so, the Court
recognized that the chance that a man would be accepted into a training
program was reduced because of the law, yet it held that this reduction
was justified because women's opportunities to compete with men for
later employment could not be increased without increasing the number
of training positions for women, and because the training quota did not
completely exclude men from such positions.
Thus, the Court rejected the argument that a quota automatically violates
men's rights to equal opportunities, and in so doing, moved away from
the strict dichotomy between permissible equal opportunities and
impermissible equal results that the applicants claimed was the holding
of Kalanke v. Bremen.23 Instead, the Court stressed that the Equal
Treatment Directive prohibits inflexible quotas. Since training positions
were available in the private sector, it reasoned, no man was completely
excluded from training by the government quota.
It would thus appear that according to the Court an inflexible quota is
one that completely excludes men from a position. It remains to be seen
21.
22.
23.

Case C-158/97, re: Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875 (Mar. 28, 2000), Opinion at para 40.
Case C-158/97, re Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875 (Mar. 28, 2000), Judgment at para. 51-55.
Case C-450/93, Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, 1995 E.C.R. 1-03051 (1995).
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if this reading of the Directive will be limited to pure training positions
held prior to employment or will be extended to employment/training
positions. Pure training is necessary for employment, but training for a
higher position may require employment in a lower position that in effect
operates as on-the-job training.
If the Court's ruling is not limited to pure tralfung posItions, then
arguably a quota for an employment/training position is not inflexible
and thus is permissible so long as there is evidence that male candidates
for the position can obtain similar positions in the private sector. Since
this will often be the case, virtually no quota for an employment/training
position can be considered inflexible and hence impermissible on this
basis alone.
The authors are not challenging the Court's result, of which we approve.
But we do wish to emphasize that the Court is allowing member states to
use positive action in a way that virtually compels an employment
decision favoring women. This is an important policy preference for the
Court not for this reason alone, but also because of the opposition in
some of the member states to any form of quota, which, it is argued, is a
form of impermissible reverse discrimination. 24
6.

Fourth Challenged Provision

The fourth specific issue before the Court concerned a provision of the
law that guaranteed job interviews for qualified women for positions for
which women were under-represented.
The AG and tbe Court agreed that this provision was consistent with the
EU Directive. 25 The provision did not require an inflexible result in
hiring a certain number of women, but merely aided women in the
deliberative process for a position. Thus, as with the training issue, the
Court construed the Equal Treatment Directive broadly so as to allow
positive action to aid women in the process up to the final employment
decision. This result is consistent with the prior position of the Court
that positive action is permissible so long as it helps women achieve
equality of opportunity with men. Positive action is inconsistent with
equal opportunity when it seeks to achieve a specific result, that is, a

24. EU PROPOSALS TO COMBAT DISCRIMINATION, English House of Lords, Select Committee
on the E.U. 9th Report, 25 May 2000 at para.122-24 at http://www.parliament.the-stationeryoffice.co. uk/pa/ld 199900lldselectlldeucom/6816809.htm.
25. Case C-158/97, re Badeck, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875 (Mar. 28, 2000), Opinion at para 41;
Judgment at para. 60-63.
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specific number of women in a specific job, by means of an inflexible
quota.
One may wonder if the Court would have reached the same result had
there been evidence before it that qualified men might not be granted
interviews because an employer determined that for cost reasons, say, it
could interview only a certain number of persons, all of whom were
qualified women. Suppose, for example, that an employer decides that it
can afford to interview only three candidates for any job openings.
Three women are qualified and thus are interviewed. One male
candidate has qualifications that appear superior to the qualifications of
any of the female candidates prior to the interviews. But as a result of
the interviews at least one female candidate is judged superior to the
male candidate. Each candidate has been objectively considered in light
of all available evidence, but the male candidate has not been afforded
the opportunity to provide the sort of evidence that can emerge from a
job interview. Such a procedure might greatly aid the job prospects of
women and so allow employers to structure the evaluation process to
favor women. Opponents of positive action might argue that such a
procedure hardly appears consistent with equal opportunity for men and
women. The interview quota creates an obstacle to the hiring of men that
does not exist for women. And yet such a procedure might not appear
impermissible to the Court, because the inequality would exist with
respect to a pre-employment decision and the Court is prepared to allow
greater member-state flexibility for positive action in such decisions than
it would for positive action in employers' final employment decisions.
However, at least one commentator believes that any all-woman short list
violates the Equal Treatment Directive. 26
Again, we are not challenging the Court's decision, of which we
approve; rather we seek to make it clear that the Court is allowing
member states' legislative bodies to virtually compel employment
decisions favoring women without expressly stating so.
7.

Fifth Challenged Provision

The fifth specific provision before the Court did not involve employment
directly. Instead, it involved appointments to employee representative
bodies and to supervisory bodies, i.e., internal administrative bodies of

26. Peter Jebsen, The Need for More Women Members of Parliament, NEW L.J. (April 7,
2000) at www.peterjepson.comlnew_page_18.htm.
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the employer. The law at issue required that one-half of all the members
of these bodies be'women.
The AG decided that there was no way to interpret this provision to make
it consistent with the Equal Treatment Directive,27 as on its face the
position created a fixed number of positions for women regardless of
their qualifications and the rights of men to compete for these positions.
The Court disagreed. 28 The Court interpreted this provision as nonmandatory, thus reading it in light of the provision discussed earlier to
the effect that certain objective criteria may rebut the presumption in
favor of the woman. According to the Court, the provision did not
establish a mandatory or inflexible quota. Instead, the law recommended
a goal to the employer which allowed the employer to consider criteria
other than gender in making appointments to these bodies, so long as
gender was one factor in the decision until women constituted fifty
percent of the members of these bodies. Only under this second
interpretation could the national law be consistent with EU law.
8.

Significance of This Decision

First, the AG proposed that in light of recent provisions regarding gender
equality in the Treaty of Amsterdam, national laws promoting positive
action for women are to be broadly interpreted so as to increase the
integration of women into the workplace. In deciding this case, the
Court did not need to revisit its interpretation of the Equal Treatment
Directive that positive action is only justified to enable women to
compete with men. Perhaps in a future case the Court will follow this
AG and interpret positive action not as a narrow exception to the equality
principle but as an indispensable means to the end of fully integrating
women into the workplace whenever other means have failed to achieve
this goal.
Second, the Court has insisted that any preference for women must be
rebuttable by objective criteria that do not themselves discriminate
against women. In this case, the Court allowed a national legislature to
create other gender-neutral preferences that public employers may use to
override the gender preference. In addition, the European Commission
has submitted a proposal to implement the principle of equal treatment
for all persons by prohibiting discrimination based on race and ethnic

27.
28.

Case C-158/97. re Badeck. 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875 (Mar. 28. 2000). Opinion at para. 42.
Case C-158/97. re Badeck. 2000 E.C.R. 1-1875 (Mar, 28. 2000). Judgment at para, 64-66.
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origin. 29 Future empirical investigations should reveal whether public
employers are using preferences for other groups to dilute the effect the
gender preference might have in placing more women in substantial
positions in the workplace.
Third, the limitations, if any, on an employer's consideration of the
objective criteria justifying hiring a man contrary to a preference for
women have not been settled by the Court. For example, work history
and length of service are objective criteria that are relevant to an
employment decision, and so they are available in a specific employment
decision to enable a public employer to hire a man over an equally
qualified women for a position where women are under-represented.
However, if women in fact are out of the workplace for longer periods
than men, in part because of the need to care for children, then is this
criterion impermissible because it has a discriminatory impact on female
employment?
Fourth, if evidence becomes available that positive action is not working
to increase the number of women in significant positions in the
workplace/o in part because of the reasons described above, is the Court
prepared to say that positive action has increased opportunities for
women to compete for jobs? If the answer is "yes," then must the Court
conclude that women have failed to compete successfully because of
individual or social forces that the EU law is not prepared to remedy? Or
will the Court adopt the position of AG Saggio that EU law should be
broadly interpreted so as to permit positive action to go farther than it
presently has?
Fifth, the Court has affirmed its intent to continue to distinguish between
impermissible fixed quotas and permissible flexible goals. However, in
the case of employment quotas tied to vocational training and interview
quotas, the Court is prepared to search out ways to allow quotas that
initially appear inflexible. For example, the Court allows academic
quotas when they are tied to the number of persons trained, a number that
may vary from time to time so that men are not completely excluded
from these positions. However, opponents of positive action may argue
that a quota is still inflexible if the employer selects a method that
virtually or in practice guarantees that a woman will be hired, even
without setting an absolute number of women to be hired. In these

29. Council Directive 2000/431EC of June 29, 2000 Implementing the Principle of Equal
Treatment between Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin, 2000 0.1. (L 16E156).
30. ARNULL, supra note I, at 505.
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circumstances, is the Court balancing the desirability of men's not losing
significant employment opportunities to women if similar training
opportunities are available in the private sector against the gain in
employment opportunities for women? What if the facts that must be
considered to achieve such a balance are different in different cases?
What if the cost of private training is prohibitively expensive?
In summary, the Court must be forward-looking in its principles. What if
the free market economy does not insure that employers do not
discriminate in the final analysis? If the Court's narrow interpretation of
the Equal Treatment Directive in terms of a sharp dichotomy between
equal opportunities and equal results is intended to al~ow the market to
solve this problem and it does not, then what will the Court do? It is
possible that the Court will appeal to judicial conservatism, maintaining
that it is merely an interpreter of laws passed by others. It seems to us
that the Court should recognize that a key principle of interpretation is to
appreciate the goal sought by the lawmaker and to assist the lawmaker in
achieving that goal.
We question whether the flexible/inflexible
dichotomy will achieve the goal of improving the situation of working
women under the narrow interpretation of the Court, unless the Court's
reasoning is expanded as has been suggested above. The Court should
recognize that an employment quota, and not merely training or
interview quotas, even if it is inflexible in the short term, is a permissible
means to achieve equality of opportunity, especially if the more limited
forms of positive action permitted by the Court continue to be ineffective
in integrating women into vocational and professional positions. Finally,
as argued below, the Court should recognize that changes in the Treaty
of Amsterdam point to a more expansive notion of equality than formal
equality of opportunity. They encourage a notion of substantive equality
that requires the workplace to be structured to accommodate different
social and f:J~nilial responsibilities of men and women.
C.

ABRAHAMSSON

1.

Issue

The issue of first impression in this case was whether the Equal
Treatment Directive permitted the use of positive action where a female
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candidate is qualified but lacks qualifications equal to those of a male
candidate. 3 !
2.

Procedural History

The University of Goteburg in Sweden decided to appoint a woman to a
professorial chair. A Swedish regulation required positive action to be
used in making such decisions since added effort was necessary to
significantly increase the number of female professors. Swedish law
provided that positive action could not be used when the difference in
candidate qualifications was so great that ignoring that difference would
breach the requirement of objective decision-making. This objectivity
requirement had been interpreted to mean that a difference is too great if
and only if the appointment of the less qualified candidate is likely to
reduce the level of performance in the position. 32
The University had also instituted a plan to achieve a fairer allocation of
teaching positions between men and women.
In light of these
considerations, the Rector of the University decided that the difference
between the merits of a female candidate and those of a male candidate
who was judged better qualified was not so great as to override the
preference for a female candidate. He appointed the female candidate to
the position. 33
The male candidate and another female candidate appealed. The male
candidate claimed the appointment of the first female candidate was
contrary to Swedish law and the Equal Treatment Directive. 34 The
second female candidate appealed on the ground that her qualifications
were in fact higher than those of the female candidate who was
appointed, and who had been ranked ahead of her in scientific
qualifications by the selection board. She did not dispute that the male
candidate had scientific qualifications superior to hers.
The Court interpreted Swedish law as requiring that the preference
favoring women be absolute. The Court found nothing in Swedish law

31. Case C-407/98, Abrahamsson
at para. 45.
32. Case C-407/98, Abrahamsson
at para. 23-26.
33. Case C-407/98, Abrahamsson
at para. 16-20.
34. Case C-407/98, Abrahamsson
at para. 21.
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to allow a genuine assessment of the objective qualifications of all
candidates for a position. Under this interpretation, Swedish law was
contrary to EU law. The Court then considered whether Swedish law
could be upheld because the law was a proportionate or permissible
means to achieve equality of opportunity. The Court concluded that it
was not and thus found that the Swedish positive action law was contrary
to the Equal Treatment Directive. 35
The Court also considered numerous secondary issues, which did not
affect its result or its analysis. For example, the Court ruled its result
would not be changed if the academic posts to which positive action was
applied were limited to lower level positions. 36
3.

Significance of This Decision

A key question regarding the Court's reasoning is why the Court did not
expansively interpret the Swedish law by reading into the law its
requirement that any preference favoring women must be rebuttable by
evidence of objective considerations that may exist for each candidate.
One answer is that the Swedish court's interpretation of the objectivity
principle in Swedish law precluded the Court from interpreting the
principle differently from the way national courts had interpreted it.
Presumably by interpreting the objectivity principle in terms of the likely
effect of the appointment on the level of performance in the position, the
Swedish court intended the interpretation of the principle to focus on
consequences and not the evaluation of candidate qualifications. The
Court may have been signaling lawmakers in other member states to
eschew the Swedish interpretation of similar principles in favor of the
Court's interpretation of that language. The Court may have felt that the
Swedish interpretation was too permissive, since appointments will
rarely be so adversely affected by differences in qualifications. Also, the
Swedish interpretation's forward-looking stance does not allow for the
gender preference to be rebutted by other legally permissible preferences
for other under-represented groups.

35. /d.
36. Case C-407/98, Abrahamsson v. Fogelqvist, 2000 E.C.R. 1-05539 (July 6, 2000), Judgment
at para. 57, 66.
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SCHNORBUS V. LAND HESSE

1.

Issue

47

The primary issue before the Court was whether an automatic priority in
admission to legal training for persons who complete compulsory
national service that is only available to men violated the Equal
Treatment Directive. 37
2.

Procedural History

Ms. Schnorbus applied for practical legal trammg but was rejected
because there were already too many applications from persons who had
completed compUlsory national service. Her appeal was rejected on the
ground that the preference for applicants to legal training who had
completed compulsory service was objectively justified. 38
She appealed this decision to a higher court. In the meantime, her
application for training was granted. Nevertheless, she maintained her
appeal for declaratory relief that the decisions denying her training were
a form of unlawful gender discrimination. 39
3.

Analysis

The Court first considered whether the compulsory service preference
constituted direct or indirect discrimination. Direct discrimination
explicitly or necessarily treats persons differently because of their sex.
Indirect discrimination occurs when a seemingly neutral factor
(provision, criterion or practice) disadvantages a disproportionately large
number of persons of one sex but not the other. 40
The Court decided that the compulsory service preference was not
directly discriminatory, but was indirectly discriminatory, because
women, not being subject to the requirement of such service, cannot

37. Case C-79/99, Schnorbus v. Land Hesse, 2000 E.C.R. 1-0000 (Dec. 7, 2000), Judgment at
para. 16, Opinion at para. 1.
38. Case C-79/99, Schnorbus v. Land Hesse, 2000 E.C.R. 1-0000 (Dec. 7, 2000), Judgment at
para. 14-16.
39. Case C-79/99, Schnorbus v. Land Hesse, 2000 E.c.R. 1-0000 (Dec. 7, 2000), Judgment at
para. 17-19, Opinion at para. 12-17.
40. Case C-79/99, Schnorbus v. Land Hesse, 2000 E.c.R. 1-0000 (Dec. 7, 2000), Judgment at
para. 30-39, Opinion at para. 30-46, referring to Case 96/80, Jenkins 1981 E.C.R. 911, 937. See
generalIy, Regina V. Secretary of State for Employment, Case C-167/97, Ex parte Seymour-Smith,
1999 E.C.R. 1-0623, C.E.C. 79 (1999); and ARNULL, supra note 1,486-94.
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benefit from the preference. In reaching this decision the Court did not
consider statistics regarding the actual effect of the preference on women
because the number of women who could take advantage of the
preference was zero:'
The Court then considered whether the preference could be saved from a
judgment of invalidity because any discrimination is justified by
objective considerations which are not themselves discriminatory. The
Court concluded that the preference provided a justified way of counterbalancing the delay in training suffered by men required to undergo
compulsory service.
Therefore, it held, the compulsory serVIce
preference did not violate the Equal Treatment Directive.42
4.

Significance of This Decision

The Court's reasoning can be clarified by consideration of the opinion of
the Advocate General ("AG").4J According to the AG, two different but
related justifications exist for discrimination in EU law. One, expressly
relating to indirect discrimination, is set forth in Directive 97/80, which
provides that indirect discrimination may be justified by objective factors
unrelated to sex. The Court relied on this justification in its judgment. A
second justification for discrimination is provided for in the Equal
Treatment Directive and is not limited to indirect discrimination. This
Directive provides that discrimination is justified by measures that are
intended to promote equality of opportunity for men and women. The
significance of the Court's judgment is that it held that the first or
objective factors justification, though originally created for indirect
discrimination cases, is available for direct discrimination cases as well.
This means that a national legislature or an employer may create
preferences for groups other than women and then may justify rebutting
the preference in favor of women by these other objective preferences.
EU equality law and the Court's gender discrimination decisions may
create unrealized expectations in women, because preferences for women
may be rebutted by preferences for other groups created by employers or
national legislatures. The problem of balancing different preferences for
under-represented groups is a difficult one. However, is it realistic to

41. Case C-79/99, Schnorbus v. Land Hesse, 2000 E.C.R. 1-0000 (Dec. 7, 2000), Judgment at
para. 30-39.
42. Case C-79/99, Schnorbus v. Land Hesse, 2000 E.C.R. 1-0000 (Dec. 7, 20(0), Judgment at
para. 40-47.
43. Case C-79/99, Schnorbus v. Land Hesse, 2000 E.C.R. 1-0000 (Dec. 7, 2000), Opinion at
para. 34-35,47-55.
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expect that the limited positive action endorsed by the Court will actually
improve the situation of women in the workplace if the limited
preference of women can be rebutted by preferences for other underrepresented groups? Women will not believe that the failure to achieve
equal results in the workplace lies with them, or that they have been
allowed equality of opportunity but have simply been unable to compete
with men.

III.

AMENDMENT TO THE EQUAL TREATMENT DIRECTIVE

On June 7, 2000, the European Commission published its proposal to
amend the Equal Treatment Directive. The primary purpose of the
amendments was to establish new provisions regarding sexual
harassment. But some amendments were made to bring the Directive in
line with the Court's positive action case law and the Treaty of
Amsterdam and the Commission's 1999 anti-discrimination directives. 44
The Commission summarized the positive action principles derivable
from the Court's case law as follows. Positive action is an exception to
the principle of equal treatment that is limited to measures intended to
eliminate or reduce actual instances of inequality. No automatic priority
for women, even if they are under-represented in a job, can be justified,
but a rebuttable presumption in their favor can be justified if equally
qualified male candidates for a position will be objectively assessed for
the position. In addition, the Commission added a new Article 8 to the
Directive, requiring member states to establish an independent body to
promote equal treatment of men and women, which will investigate sex
discrimination complaints, initiate administrative and judicial
proceedings, and publish surveys and reports.
The proposal is fine as a summary of the Court's judgments up to
Badeck; however, the proposal does not go far enough in light of the
criticisms of the Court's position and in light of the more proactive
language of the Treaty. One scholar has criticized the Court's emphasis
on free market individualism as an assumption for interpreting the Equal
Treatment Directive. Sandra Fredman advocates that the Court consider
that group membership is a legitimate non-discriminatory basis for
member states to enact positive action plans that favor women. 45 Others

44. See European Industrial Relations Observatory On-Line, Commission Proposes
Amendments to 1976 Equal Treatment Directive at www.eiro.eurofound.iel2000106/features/
EUOOO6255F.html.
45.
Sandra Fredman, Reversing Discrimination, 113 L.Q. REV. 575, 596 (1997).
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have also argued that women's unequal place in society, including the
workforce, is the result of socio-historical forces, and that this inequality
cannot be reduced by market forces alone without government
intervention. 46
Part of the solution may be provided by the proposal for gender
main streaming, a proposal rooted in recognition that market and
government policies have a different impact on men and women because
of their different family roles and due to the traditional structure of the
workplace as a place that husbands go while their wives stay home.
According to proponents of gender mainstreaming, positive action must
require not just numerical equality of women with men in traditional
husband-structured workplaces but reorganization of the workplace to
make it easier for women to work on the job and in the home: 7 The
European Commission has adopted gender mainstreaming and has
required that it be incorporated in all Commission policies and
activities:8 The Commission has also recognized that the Treaty of
Amsterdam has formalized the European commitment to gender
mainstreaming ~y specifying that. the principle of equal treatment shall
not prevent any member state from taking steps to promote equality
between men and women. 49
As these advances in the Commission's thinking about gender equality
are incorporated by the Court, undoubtedly the Court's positive action
judgments will move beyond formal equality of opportunity for women
to compete with men in a man's world. The Court will likely recognize
that genuine gender equality requires that positive action plans be
constructed to recognize differences in the biology, culture, and social
responsibilities of men and women. A successful positive action plan

46. NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, Affirmative Action: A Discussion Paper,
Consistency 2000 Report, Part C at www.justice.govt.nzlpubs/reportsI1998lhrc_consistency/
part_c_12.htmL
47. Gender Mainstreaming: Conceptual Framework, Methodology and Presentation of Good
Practices, Final Report of Activities of the Group of Specialists on Mainstreaming, Council of
Europe Comm. of Ministers, Doc. No. GR-EG(98)1 (1998) at http://www.coe.fr/cmlreports/1998/
98gregl.htm. See also Pollack & Hafner-Burton, Mainstreaming Gender in the European Union, 7
J. EUR. PUB. POL'y 432 (2000).
48. Incorporating Equal Opportunities for Women and Men into all Community Policies and
Activities, 1996 O.J. (C 386), COM(96)67. See also Mainstreaming Equal Opportunities for
Women and Men in Structural Fund Programmes and Projects, COM(98)122. But see, SIPTU,
supra note 12 where it is stated that despite the verbal commitment the Commission has made little
progress in integrating research into the differential effects of its policies on men and women, which
is a first step in effecti ve gender mainstreaming.
49. Towards A Community Framework Strategy on Gender Equality (2001-2005),
COM(00)335, Brussels, July 6, 2000.
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consistent with EU law not only reduces inequalities so that women can
join men in the traditional workplace, but also creates workplaces III
which differences between men and women are respected.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although affirmative action cases in the United States involving gender
discrimination have recently received less attention than cases involving
racial discrimination, particularly cases involving public contracts and
higher education, the authors believe it is important for the United States
to remain focused on the need for affirmative action for women. Recent
decisions of the European Court of Justice involving positive action for
women in employment and the amendments to the underlying EU gender
equality law should help Americans keep the issue alive. Further,
familiarity with European opinions, judgments, directives, and treaties
can not only can help Americans rethink arguments for and against
various affirmative action proposals in light of the reasoning employed in
European discussions,50 it can also make them aware of new methods of
affirmative action being tried in Europe that might be attempted in the
States.

50. European plans upheld by the European Court of 1ustice in Marschall, Badek,
Abrahamsson, and Schnorbus would allow an affirmative action plan that seeks to achieve the same
proportion of women in each job as exists in the general popUlation. Such plans have been rejected
by the U. S. Supreme Court on numerous occasions on grounds that they are based on an
unsupported assumption that women will make up the same percentage of applicants for any given
position as they do in the general popUlation.
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